ARMY FORCE GENERATION: BALANCING MISSIONS IN THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
The image was clear and projected the message quite well, "Victory." On 01 May 2003, President Bush, arriving aboard the USS Lincoln in a Navy Lockheed S-3 Viking, pronounced to the world that major combat operations in Iraq were over and America had scored a major victory in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). News coverage of the event would last for hours, providing a form of redemption for the administration and a springboard for the 2004 elections. 1 Below the proverbial waterline, the military was in a transitional period that signaled all was not well in efforts to maintain momentum in operations that spanned across numerous conflicts throughout the world. In 2003, the U.S. military had almost 388,000 soldiers stationed on foreign soil. 2 For the Army National Guard, the past two years represented an accelerated transition from a strategic to an operational reserve that had slowly progressed since the 1991
Gulf War. In May 2003, the Army National Guard had almost 80,000 of its 346,000 soldiers deployed in support of seven different missions across the globe. 3 By 2006, almost 75% of Army National Guard personnel had deployed in support of the GWOT. Forces. 5 During an address to the same meeting, Secretary Rumsfeld stated that the entire Reserve Component deployment process was not, "managed skillfully in a single place." Guard units. Units would be task organized into modular expeditionary forces tailored to joint mission requirements while still providing civil authorities with access to Army National Guard units. Units would be sufficiently manned, equipped, and trained to meet domestic emergencies. 25 The plan's broad end state: The Army National Guard achieves a sustained, more predictable posture to generate trained and ready modular forces tailored to joint mission requirements while preserving Army National Guard capability to defend the homeland, respond to domestic emergencies, surge to conduct major combat operations, and sustain the quality of the all-volunteer force in persistent conflict.
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Perhaps COL John Renaud, Army National
Guard chief of strategic plans and policy, describes the effect of ARFORGEN the best, "Years ago, in the strategic Reserve, you maybe mobilized once in a 20-year career." Furthermore, he added that since the Army National Guard has transitioned to an operation reserve, "mobilization is an expectation, not an exception." 27 While the Army National Guard ARFORGEN I-Plan shared many similarities with the Army I-Plan, it additionally requires that Army National Guard units be "…prepared to respond to domestic emergencies under command and control of their respective governors." 28 This dynamic alone sets the Army National Guard approach to ARFORGEN apart from the Active Component. The domestic support mission represents a degree of importance that many Army National Guard leaders express as the primary reason the Army National Guard existed. LTG Blum, Director for the National Guard, stated that "Homeland defense is mission one for the National Guard. Governors count on the National Guard to be the first military responder and call on the Guard assets at their disposal within hours of an event, which makes resourcing crucial." 29 The Army National Guard is currently executing the Bridging State phase of their I-Plan.
While the I-Plan acknowledges serious resources constraints, the plan boasts of an effective strategy to generate forces to meet operational requirements. The goal of the Bridging State is to reach one deployment in every six years, which will signal a transition to the final phase of the I-Plan: the Objective State. In the Bridging State, the Army National Guard will have achieved a balance between requirements and capabilities. 30 Like the Army I-Plan, the Army National compact. An EMAC covers a wide variety of emergency or disaster assistance to include natural disasters, technological hazards, man-made disasters, civil emergency resource shortages, community disorders, insurgency threats, or enemy attack. 36 The Louisiana EMAC provides one multi-functional battalion consisting of 444 personnel and equipment within 48
hours of a projected hurricane landfall. 37 Along with the Louisiana EMAC, the Arkansas Army National Guard can expect to activate as many as 300 soldiers to support future State Active Duty (SAD) missions, given recent trends in internal disaster response missions. In order to balance these competing demands, leaders must integrate domestic support mission forecasts into the ARFORGEN model or face shortfalls in future domestic emergencies.
While many facets of ARFORGEN are in place in the Arkansas Army National Guard, leaders are developing final plans concurrently with the Army and Army National Guard.
Arkansas Army National Guard officials state that they remain involved with transformation working groups as they have for the past 18 months. 38 While the Arkansas Army National
Guard plan is in its formulation stage, elements of the National Guard plans can be found in the several documents currently driving the Arkansas Army National Guard ARFORGEN process. and Republican Conventions, and several border security missions. 45 In FY-03, use of Reserve
Component forces peaked at 62.8 million duty days, almost five times higher than any previous year in the past decade. 46 Military leaders state that the Global War on Terrorism is a war of long duration; consequently, Army National Guard units can expect to be used at rates well above pre-9/11 and pre-Katrina figures. 47 The story is no different for the Arkansas Army National Guard is fortunate to have 100.7% of assigned strength, or 8219 Soldiers, and ranks seventh nationally in assigned strength among other Army National Guard states and territories. 57 Even though assigned strength exceeds authorized strength, the Arkansas Army National Guard is still loses approximately 18% of personnel each year due to normal attrition. National Guard stood at 78.6% DMOSQ, according to Army National Guard figures. 59 Analysis also reveals that DMOSQ rates are weak across the Army National Guard, peaking out at 87%
in Puerto Rico and South Dakota but averaging only 76% across the Army National Guard. 
